Rational Decisions: The Adaptive Nature of Context-Dependent Choice by Rosati, Alexandra G. & Stevens, Jeffrey R.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Faculty Publications, Department of Psychology Psychology, Department of 
2009 
Rational Decisions: The Adaptive Nature of Context-Dependent 
Choice 
Alexandra G. Rosati 
Duke University, alexandra.rosati@duke.edu 
Jeffrey R. Stevens 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, jstevens5@unl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychfacpub 
 Part of the Psychiatry and Psychology Commons 
Rosati, Alexandra G. and Stevens, Jeffrey R., "Rational Decisions: The Adaptive Nature of Context-
Dependent Choice" (2009). Faculty Publications, Department of Psychology. 525. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychfacpub/525 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology, Department of at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications, 
Department of Psychology by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
6 Rational Decisions: The Adaptive Nature of Context-Dependent 
Choice 
Alexandra G. Rosati! and Jeffrey R. Stevens2 
I Department of Evolutionary Anthropology and Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke 
University, United States 
2 Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany 
Although classical economic theory hinges on the assumption that rational actors 
should seek to maximize gains, psychologists and behavioral economists have 
recently collected a wealth of evidence challenging this premise. In violation of the 
principles of rational choice, context appears to dramatically influence human deci-
sion making. Like humans, numerous nonhuman animals, ranging from honeybees 
to primates, are sensitive to context, suggesting deep evolutionary roots for seem-
ingly irrational decision-making. Many psychologists have suggested that such 
choices may stem from cognitive biases that result in errors. We contend, however, 
that labeling context-dependent choices as errors obscures the real issue. Natural 
selection does not create organisms that adhere to economic theory-it creates 
decision makers that maximize fitness. We review evidence that many species 
show context-dependence when making decisions and then present a framework 
for analyzing the adaptive consequences of these choices. We argue for an ap-
proach weaving psychological perspectives into an evolutionary framework to elu-
cidate the nature of decision making. 
Would you rather receive $100 today or $105 tomorrow? Often people are split 50/50 when 
facing this choice; some preferring the immediacy of the $100, and others preferring the 
larger payoff of $105. However, when given the option between $100 in 30 days and $105 
in 31 days, an almost unanimous winner emerges: $105. This switch is puzzling because, 
although both cases involve an additional $5 for waiting an extra day, temporal context in-
fluences preferences. That is, immediacy provides a strong temptation to prefer the smaller 
reward, but pushing both options into the future makes waiting for the larger reward much 
easier. The standard economic model of this kind of intertemporal choice (Samuelson, 1937) 
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cannot account for these so-called 'preference reversals' (Strotz, 1955; Thaler, 1981). 
Humans therefore appear to choose irrationally when making temporal decisions, at 
least according to classical economic theory. Behavioral economists have identified a 
number of decision-making 'anomalies' like this, which violate principles of rational choice 
(Camerer et aI., 2004; Thaler, 1992). Psychologists have investigated these violations as 
'cognitive biases' that lead to systematic errors in decision making (Kahneman et aI., 1982; 
Kahneman and Tversky, 2000; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). However, such investiga-
tions do not provide an explanation for the context-dependent decisions, only a description. 
More generally, why should decision makers value options differently depending on con-
text? We argue that human choice behavior is not anomalous, but rather has deep evolution-
ary origins: context-dependent decisions occur across an array of animal taxa. This suggests 
that context-dependent decisions may provide adaptive responses to an organism's environ-
ment (Gigerenzer et aI., 1999; Kacelnik, 2006; Payne et aI., 1993) . Here we briefly review 
assumptions and predictions of rational choice theory and then examine decision making in 
nonhuman animals to identify the situations under which context-dependent choice arise. By 
doing so, we can begin to formulate an evolutionary framework to explore the ultimate con-
. sequences of such choices across species, including humans. 
1 Rational Decisions 
Rational choice theory derives primarily from the expected utility theory developed by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). This theory describes utility as an index of 'goodness' 
or goal achievement and assumes that decision makers attempt to maximize their expected 
utility. That is, individuals should prefer options that offer the highest utility weighted by the 
probability of acquiring that option. From a few basic assumptions, expected utility theory 
predicts how 'rational actors' should behave (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947). 
Most fundamentally, expected utility theory assumes that utility is independently deter-
mined for each option-that is, decision makers assign a single value to an outcome that 
holds across all situations. Consequently, preferences between different options should be 
absolute: if the utility of option x exceeds the utility of option y, individuals should always 
prefer x to y. This model of decision making assumes that individuals possess an ordered list 
describing their complete set of preferences. For example, a piece of cauliflower might have 
a value of one, an orange a value of two, and an apple a value of four. Decisions then involve 
simply choosing the option with the highest value when presented with a particular choice. 
Some important principles follow from this framework. First, preferences should be transi-
tive, with a consistent ranking of preference order. That is, if an individual prefers apples to 
oranges and oranges to cauliflower, then this same individual should also prefer apples to 
cauliflower. Second, decisions should be independent of irrelevant alternatives-adding 
low-quality alternatives to a set of options should not influence decisions (Luce, 1959; 
Rieskamp et aI., 2006). For example, when given a choice between apples, oranges, and 
cauliflower, the presence or absence of the (least preferred and therefore irrelevant) cauli-
flower to the choice set should not affect relative preferences between apples and oranges. 
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Figure 1. Waite (2001 a,b) tested intransitivity and background context in gray jays by offering them 
a choice between food in two tunnels. By varying the amount of food and the distance it was 
placed in the tunnel, Waite could manipulate the value of each option. 
Finally, preferences should be invariant-the same options should produce the same deci-
sion regardless of how the experimenter presents options (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). 
That is, assuming identical outcomes for two sets of options, the manner in which the choic-
es are framed should not influence preferences. Taken together, these principles above all 
predict consistent decision making: rational choice theory ignore how initial values are as-
signed to different options, but once they are assigned, decision makers should follow 
them. 
Expected utility theory therefore represents a normative theory of choice, because it 
describes what a rational actor should do to achieve a norm of behavior, namely maximize 
utility. However, expected utility often does a poor job of predicting how humans actually 
behave (Camerer et aI., 2004; Thaler, 1992). Context-including the decision maker's pre-
vious experiences, the set of available options when they make their decisions, and the fram-
ing of these options-has a pervasive influence on human decision making (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 2000; Simonson and Tversky, 1992; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Here we 
show that content-dependent choice is also common across numerous animal taxa in the 
domains of transitive choice, background context, local context, framing effects, and tempo-
ral discounting. 
2 Context-Dependent Choice in Animals 
2.1 Transitive Preferences 
Although all of rational choice theory emerges from a foundation of ordered, transitive pref-
erences, empirical research shows that some animals violate even this most basic principle. 
For example, Waite (2001a) examined transitivity in hoarding gray jays (Perisoreus ca-
nadensis), using a paradigm in which these birds made tradeoffs between the number of 
food items available (raisins) and the travel distance necessary to acquire them (Figure 1). 
Over a series of choices, most jays consistently violated transitivity: although they preferred 
one raisin placed a short distance into a tube over two at an intermediate distance (1 short> 
2 intermediate) and preferred the same two raisins over three placed at a long distance (2 
intermediate> 3 far), they did not prefer the one close piece of food over the three far pieces 
(1 short < 3 far). In addition, Shafir (1994) presented honeybees (Apis mellifera) with forag-
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ing decisions about a set of artificial flowers. The flowers varied in the amount of nectar they 
contained and their length, with shorter flowers containing a smaller volume of nectar. Some 
individual bees violated transitivity, although the effect was much smaller than with the 
jays. Together, these results imply that some organisms do not assign absolute utilities to 
various options in their environments. Instead, animals compare options using the relevant 
dimensions (e.g., food amount and travel distance) when the choice arises. If the dimensions 
are valued differently across different choices, then intransitive preferences emerge. 
2.2 Backgronnd Context 
Violations of rationality also occur in the presence of seemingly irrelevant alternatives. The 
principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives predicts that the broader set of options 
available to an individual should not influence valuation. As a specific example, the back-
ground context of a decision (an individual's past experiences or choices) should not alter 
current choices: choosing between pizza and a hamburger for lunch should not depend on 
whether one had eggs or bagels for breakfast. Again, if preferences are absolute, no choices 
before the current one should influence decision making-the preferences are already deter-
mined. However, the preferences of some animals appear to vary depending on previous 
choices. 
Waite (2001b) examined the effect of background context on decisions by gray jays us-
ing the distance paradigm described previously (Figure 1). Half of the jays initially faced a 
background in which they chose between one raisin or three raisins; to acquire either option, 
the birds had to travel half-way into a tube. The other half of the jays faced a background 
context in which they chose between two identical options (one raisin located half-way into 
the tube). Following the background conditions, all subjects then faced a 'target choice' 
between one raisin located at the entrance to a tube (small benefit with a low cost) and three 
raisins located at the end of the tube (large benefit with a high cost). Background context 
influenced the birds' preferences in this situation: subjects experiencing the first background 
context preferred the single close raisin, but subjects in the second background condition 
chose the two options equally. Waite interpreted this result as a tradeoff between reward 
amount and the cost of traveling farther in the tube (potentially increasing predation risk). 
For jays in the first background condition, the larger reward became more costly in the target 
choice; in contrast, jays in the second background condition had no experience with the 
large reward and willingly accepted a higher cost to acquire it. 
An animal's preferences can also depend on their own nutritional condition when they 
first learn about the new reward option. Kacelnik and colleagues (Marsh et a!., 2004; Pom-
pilio et a!., 2006) introduced two novel food sources to European starlings (StUI7lUS vul-
garis) and desert locusts (Schistocerca gregaria). Both food sources provided identical re-
wards, but individuals experienced the two options under different nutritional states: they 
encountered one option in a food-deprived state and the other when pre-fed. In subsequent 
choices between the two options, both species preferred the food source they had encoun-
tered while in a low nutritional state, regardless of their state when they made their choice. 
These findings indicate that valuation can depend not only on the intrinsic qualities of the 
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Figure 2. Most choices in human and nonhuman animal experiments involve two options which 
vary on at least two attributes (here, V is superior in volume and C is superior in sucrose concen-
tration). When a third decoy option is included (D), the relative preference for the two options 
should not change, and the absolute preference should not increase. (Redrawn from Bateson et 
al. 2002). 
reward but also on the animal's own physiological state upon encountering it. 
2.3 Local Context 
The principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives predicts not only that background 
context but also local context should not influence choice. That is, the addition of new but 
irrelevant alternatives to a set of options (such as the cauliflower mentioned previously) 
should not influence the relative preferences between the original options. In addition, the 
principle of regularity predicts that adding an option to a choice set should not increase the 
absolute preference for any of the previous options (Luce, 1959; Rieskamp et a!., 2006). 
Despite these predictions, the influence of local context on choice behavior has been dem-
onstrated in taxonomically diverse animal species. In these experiments, animals initially 
are given choices between two different foraging options. As in the examples described 
above, these options normally vary on two dimensions, such as total volume of food and 
percent sugar content (Figure 2). Subsequently, the animals receive a choice between three 
options: the original options, plus a new third option. This additional option is inferior to 
both the original options on at least one dimension; for example, hummingbirds might be 
offered a third nectar source with a lower sugar concentration at an intermediate volume 
(Figure 2). Rational choice theory predicts that adding this lower-quality food source to the 
choice set should have no effect on the level of preference between the two original options. 
Studies on hummingbirds (Selasphorus rufus), honeybees, and gray jays, however, demon-
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Figure 3. Chen et al. (2006) had two experimenters offer capuchin monkeys choices between 
pieces of apple. In the first condition, the 'Gain Experimenter' showed and offered the monkeys 
one piece, whereas the 'Loss Experimenter' showed two but only offered one. In the second 
condition, the Gain Experimenter showed one piece but offered either one or two with equal prob-
ability, and the Loss Experimenter showed two and offered either one or two with equal probabil-
ity. 
strate that animals frequently change their relative preferences between the original options, 
violating the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives, and increase their prefer-
ence for the highest quality option, thereby violating regularity (Bateson et aI., 2003; Shafir 
et aI., 2002). 
2.4 Framing 
The manner in which options are presented can profoundly influence choice behavior. Tver-
sky and Kahneman (1981) originally demonstrated how framing violated the rational prin-
ciple of invariance in human preferences. They presented equivalent choices to human sub-
jects posed either in terms of subjective gains or losses and demonstrated that people avoid 
risk when making decisions framed as gains, but prefer risk when making decisions about 
losses. Marsh and Kacelnik (2002) tested an analogous scenario in starlings. They framed 
decisions as either losses or gains by first offering each bird either a very high or very low 
number of food pieces (one or seven). They then allowed the birds to choose between receiv-
ing four pieces or an equal probability of receiving either two or six pieces. Though the op-
tions had identical means, the risk associated with each option differed. For subjects who 
initially received a low number of food pieces, any of the three possible outcomes would 
increase their return and thus might be perceived as a gain. For subjects who initially re-
ceived a large amount of food, however, any option resulted in a reduction in pellet number 
and thus a loss. Marsh and Kacelnik found that, like humans, the birds preferred the risky 
option in the loss condition and therefore exhibited an effect of framing. Chen, Lakshmi-
narayanan, and Santos (2006) found similar results with capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) 
by having experimenters show the monkeys food rewards but then potentially giving them 
different rewards. For example, one experimenter showed one food reward and gave one 
reward, whereas another experimenter showed two food rewards but then only gave one 
(Figure 3). Although the payoff was the same for both experimenters (and the principle of 
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invariance therefore predicts that subjects should be indifferent between the two options), 
the monkeys preferred the constant option in which they saw and received one food reward. 
In another condition (Figure 3), the monkeys preferred an experimenter that showed one 
food reward and gave either one or two rewards with equal probability (possible gain) over 
an experimenter that showed two rewards and gave one or two with equal probability (pos-
sible loss). Chen and colleagues interpreted these results as evidence that the monkeys ex-
hibit reference-dependent choice by attending to losses and gains. The monkeys did not have 
absolute preferences for the outcome, because they were the same in both conditions. In-
stead, preferences depended on the reference point of the initial amount of food shown. 
2.5 Temporal Discounting 
Animals, including humans, constantly tradeoff between short-term preferences and future 
gains (Frederick et aI., 2002; Kacelnik, 2003; Stevens and Stephens, in press), and many 
researchers have interpreted this as discounting, or devaluing, the future. Accordingly, eco-
nomic theorists have developed a model of how reward value decreases overtime: exponen-
tial discounting (Samuelson, 1937). Notably, exponential discounting predicts that decision 
makers should exhibit consistent preferences between two options. Any temporal compo-
nent of a delay is treated as equivalent to any other interval, so preferences should remain 
the same with constant differences between the delays. Choosing between $10 now or $11 
in a week, consequently, should be functionally equivalent to choosing between $10 in a 
year or $11 in a year and a week-in both decisions, a quantitative difference of one dollar 
is associated with the same temporal difference of one week. 
Like other normative models of rational choice, exponential discounting also fails to 
accurately predict real choices. Empirical research has repeatedly demonstrated that humans 
and other animals exhibit preference reversals when discounting the future: preferences 
change as access to both options is pushed farther into the future. (Ainslie and Herrnstein, 
1981; Green et aI., 1981; Thaler, 1981). Other models of intertemporal choice such as rate 
maximization, hyperbolic discounting, and quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997; 
Mazur, 1987; Stevens and Stephens, in press) predict these preference reversals and there-
fore effects of temporal contexts. 
In humans, other types of context also influence discounting behavior, such as attention 
to the reward (Mischel et aI., 1989), sleep deprivation (Reynolds and Schiffbauer, 2004), 
social context (Wilson and Daly, 2004), and temporal framing (Read et aI., 2005). In con-
trast to the human temporal discounting literature, however, few systematic attempts have 
assessed whether animal discounting naturally varies across contexts. One exception is a 
study by Stephens and Anderson (2001), who tested blue jays (Cyanocitta cristata) in ex-
perimentally different but economically similar contexts (Figure 4). In the first context, the 
standard 'self-control' procedure, subjects made binary choices between smaller, sooner and 
larger, later food rewards (Ainslie, 1974). In the second context, the 'patch foraging' situa-
tion, subjects waited the shorter delay for the small reward and then could choose between 
continuing in the patch to receive the remaining food after a further delay or leaving the 
patch to end the trial. When continuing in the patch, the two reward amounts summed to the 
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(a) Self-control 
(b) Patch Leave 
--
x = choice point 
Figure 4. Stephens and Anderson (2001) tested how context influences temporal preferences by 
offering blue jays two economically equivalent foraging scenarios. In the self-control condition 
(a), the jays made a series of binary choices between a smaller, sooner reward (amount A, after 
time t,) and a larger, later reward (amount A2 after time delay t2)' Following each payoff was an 
intertrial interval 'to In the patch condition (b), after the intertrial interval the jays received the 
small amount after the short delay and then chose to either leave the patch and begin the inter-
trial interval or stay and wait a bit longer (t2- t,) for more food (A2- A,). A choice for the smaller, 
sooner option in the self-control situation yielded the same reward amounts and delays as the 
leave option in the patch situation, and the larger, later option was equivalent to staying in the 
patch. (Redrawn from Stephens and Anderson 2001). 
large reward and the two time delays summed to the longer delay in the self-control context. 
Therefore, the time delays and reward payoffs were equivalent between the two conditions, 
but the self-control context offered a binary choice and the patch context offered a stay-or-
leave choice. Stephens and Anderson found that at long time delays, the jays chose the 
smaller, sooner reward more often in the self-control situation, despite its economic equiva-
lence to the patch situation. 
Another example explores how two species of primates assess temporal versus spatial 
decisions. Stevens and colleagues completed a pair of studies examining cotton-top tamarins 
(Saguilllls oedipus) and common marmosets (Callithrixjaccilus), two New World monkeys. 
In the first experiment, tamarins and marmosets faced the standard self-control situation, and 
tamarins chose more impulsively than marmosets (Stevens et aI., 2005a). In the second ex-
periment, the monkeys chose between spatially varying rewards-that is, they could select 
a smaller, closer reward or a larger, more distant reward (Stevens et aI., 2005b). Tamarins 
traveled farther for rewards in the second experiment, suggesting that they are less impulsive 
than marmosets in the spatial context. This reversal of preferences across species indicates 
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that framing the choices in a temporal or a spatial context differentially influenced prefer-
ences in these monkeys. 
3 Analyzing the Evolutionary Consequences of Context 
Dependence 
These results demonstrate that the context in which a decision is made influences choices 
across a wide range of species: much like humans, other animals appear to violate a variety 
of economic principles when making decisions. Though context-dependent choice may vio-
late economic rationality principles, few researchers have provided functional explanations 
for the violations (but see McKenzie, 2004). An evolutionary perspective, however, reveals 
that context dependence may prove biologically or ecologically rational (Gigerenzer et aI., 
1999; Kacelnik, 2006). Ecological rationality refers to decision mechanisms that are spe-
cifically tailored to the environment in which they operate (Todd and Gigerenzer, 2000). 
This suggests that the rationality of a decision is not absolute and invariant but must be 
judged according to the typical decision-making environment. Thus, rather than being sub-
optimal and maladaptive, context-dependent choice may provide an adaptive response to the 
natural environments in which animals usually make decisions. 
How can we assess the adaptive nature of context-dependent choice? Notably, all of the 
nonhuman results discussed thus far fit into a general foraging framework-animals making 
choices and tradeoffs about food. Indeed, this type of research often sits at the intersection 
of behavioral ecology and behavioral economics. However, although economic models and 
the foraging models used in behavioral ecology overlap (Hammerstein and Hagen, 2005; 
Kacelnik, 2006; Stephens and Krebs, 1986), these two approaches differ in how they treat 
the 'currency' of decisions. Economic models are concerned with the subjective utility that 
decision makers expect to receive from different possible outcomes. Evolutionary analyses, 
in contrast, focus on only one type of value: influence of the choice on fitness. 
To determine the adaptive nature of context-dependent choice, we propose a three-prong 
approach that integrates cognitive mechanisms, evolutionary models, and the comparative 
method. First, realistic views of the abilities ofboundedly rational agents focus our attention 
on the actual cognitive mechanisms that animals use to make decisions. Second, evolution-
ary models of the specific choice environment provide a critical check on what is considered 
'adaptive'-sometimes what is thought to be optimal or adaptive behavior is not. Finally, if 
context-dependent choices are shaped adaptively, then preferences should vary systemati-
cally when examined in a comparative perspective across species with different ecologies. 
The comparative method-one of the most important tools in evolutionary biology-may 
therefore provide crucial insights into understanding how animals make decisions. 
3.1 Bounded Rationality: Cognitive Mechanisms in Decision Making 
From the perspective of bounded rationality, decision makers are not omniscient, computa-
tional machines that can instantly calculate the expected utility of all options present and 
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choose the optimum. Instead, real decision makers face imperfect knowledge and cognitive 
constraints such as limited or time-consuming information processing and low memory ca-
pacity and retrieval (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Simon, 1955). Therefore, rather than use an 
optimizing process to maximize utility, decision makers might actually use a variety of 
heuristics or simple rules of thumb that generally succeed at identifying the best options 
(Gigerenzer et a!., 1999; Hutchinson and Gigerenzer, 2005). This suggests that examining 
the cognitive rules and information that animals use when making decisions-rather than 
focusing solely on the behavioral outcomes of these rules-is necessary to assess the evolu-
tionary consequences of their choices. A further advantage of examining the cognitive 
mechanisms supporting the observed behaviors is that, once the rules that guide animal's 
choices are known, the performance of such rules can be compared across different potential 
environments (e.g., Houston et a!., 2007a). 
This approach has been successfully applied to several types of choices that animals 
commonly face. For example, Stephens, et a!. (2004) suggested that the context-dependent 
choice in temporal discounting found in blue jays (Stephens and Anderson, 2001) may result 
from a simple rule of maximizing the short-term food intake rate, rather than calculating a 
rate over a longer timeframe. Stephens and colleagues argued that the patch choice situation 
offers a more realistic foraging scenario, and stay-or-leave decisions-continue to deplete 
the current patch or move on to a fresh patch-may better represent the kinds of decisions 
upon which natural selection has acted (Figure 4). Because the short-term rule is equivalent 
to the long-term rule in the patch situation in terms of calculating intake rate, it may be used 
because it is computationally less expensive and therefore a simpler rule for animals to im-
plement (Real, 1991). Applying this rule in the self-control context, however, results in 
more impulsive choice (and lower overall intake rates). Thus, the same rule can result in 
suboptimal outcomes in contexts that animals are less likely to face in the real world (Hou-
ston et a!., 2007b). 
A more broadly applicable choice rule is a comparative evaluation of options, rather than 
the absolute determinations of value that many economic models assume (Shafir, 1994; 
Tversky, 1969). This applies especially to choices between options that vary on multiple 
dimensions, because calculating a single overall utility value for each option may require 
difficult computations (Real, 1996). Tversky (1969) originally argued that this kind of com-
parative choice may provide a more cognitively efficient mechanism than assigning absolute 
utility because of the ease in evaluating within a dimension across options rather than to as-
sign utility across dimensions for each option. Therefore, comparative choice mechanisms 
may provide simpler evaluation processes, though occasionally producing intransitive 
choices. Shafir (1994), however, pointed out that intransitive choice may occur only in re-
stricted circumstances and therefore may not face strong selection pressure: the errors are 
too rare to have an important effect on fitness. Similar arguments have been made for local 
context effects (Bateson et a!., 2003). 
Valuation based on state-dependent learning may reflect another kind of cognitively ef-
ficient rule: organisms may attribute value to an option according to the marginal fitness gain 
associated with this option in the past (Kacelnik and Marsh, 2002; Marsh et a!., 2004). This 
rule will select the highest-value reward under most normal circumstances. If, however, an 
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animal encounters an option in a low nutritional state, the calculated marginal gain will be 
higher than if they had encountered it in a high nutritional state. That is, the benefit provided 
by one piece of food is higher for a hungry animal than a satiated animal, so dissociations 
between an animal's state when it learns about an option and its state when it makes choices 
can therefore result in paradoxical preferences. 
3.2 Context Dependence as Adaptive: Reassessing Optimality 
Rather than being a misapplication of a decision rule or comparative decision strategy, con-
text dependence could be optimal and provide adaptive benefits on its own: our assumptions 
about what is adaptive may not be correct! From this perspective, natural selection does not 
assign absolute values to options, so it is not an 'error' for animals to fail to make decisions 
according to an absolute metric. Rather, value is inherently relative-the selective value of 
a decision depends on the decision-making context, and the value of a decision for an organ-
ism may depend on previous decisions. Houston (1997) developed a model demonstrating 
how background foraging rates can produce different 'best options' in a novel choice situa-
tion. With a high background intake rate, time is very valuable, and thus spending time on 
activities that do not contribute to the rate is costly. Consequently, options with short han-
dling times (and thus small gains) may offer the best payoff. If, however, the background 
rate is lower, time is not as important, and options with longer handling times (and therefore 
larger gains) could provide greater benefits. Houston's model can also account for intransi-
tive choices. Because the best option for a forager depends on the background rate, and 
choosing an option must update the background rate, choices may alter the background rate 
over repeated decisions such that intransitive choices arise. 
Another context that has important implications for adaptive choice is the state of the 
decision maker (Houston and McNamara, 1999). Forinstance, the energetic state of foragers 
may influence their risk preferences: hungry animals may prefer risky options and satiated 
animals avoid risk (Caraco et a!., 1980; but see Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996). State depend-
ence is important because of the likely concave nature of the fitness function-as the state of 
an individual increases, the fitness benefit received from that state experiences diminishing 
returns. Therefore, a gain of two food units has different influence on fitness depending on 
the state of the individual-it generates a larger increase in fitness at low states. At low 
states, options yielding higher fitness benefits may be more preferred than when at high 
states (Kacelnik and Marsh, 2002). Schuck-Paim et a!. (2004) suggested that many of th.e 
local context effects reported in animals may result from changes in the states of the sub-
jects. An experiment with starlings demonstrated that they could eliminate violations of 
regularity in local context conditions by controlling the food intake of the subjects. There-
fore, the starlings implemented state-dependent rate maximizing rules rather than compara-
tive mechanisms of choice in binary versus trinary choice situations. 
Rate maximization itself may account for the preference reversal effect seen in temporal 
discounting in animals (raising the question whether it is really discounting). Bateson and 
Kacelnik (1996) show that starlings' performance in self-control tasks matches predictions 
of short-term rate maximization rules, and cotton-top tamarins demonstrate similar ad her-
II 
Alexandra O. Rosati and Jeffrey R. Stevens 
ence to rate maximization predictions (Stevens et aI., 2005a; Hallinan, E. V., Stevens, J. R., 
and Hauser, M. D., unpublished data). Though neither study tested for them formally, pref-
erence reversals emerge from the hyperbolic nature of rate maximization. Thus, simple 
adaptive foraging rules may result in strategies depending on temporal context. 
This kind of rate-maximization model, however, cannot account for preference reversals 
of all nonhumans: bonobos (Pan paniscus) appear to adhere to a long-term rate maximiza-
tion rule, whereas the temporal choices of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) cannot be ac-
counted for by either a short or long-term rate-maximization model (Rosati et aI., 2007). 
This implies these two phylogenetic sister species may be making temporal choices in dif-
ferent ways. Notably, one explanation for this species difference and others (such as differ-
ent performance of tamarins and marmosets in temporal and spatial discounting contexts 
described above) is that species-typical ecology served as a strong selective force shaping 
even closely related species in disparate ways (e.g., Stevens et aI., 2005a; b). The compara-
tive method provides a crucial test of whether context-dependent preferences are adaptive in 
some contexts. 
3.3 The Comparative Method: How Do Context-Dependent Preferences 
Evolve? 
One of the most powerful tools in evolutionary biology is the comparative method: examin-
ing the traits of different popUlations or species that have been shaped by differing ecologi-
cal or social forces in order to better understand how natural selection proceeded (Clutton-
Brock and Harvey, 1979; Mayr, 1982). As evolution normally occurs over historical time 
the comparative method thus allows us to reconstruct a phenomenon that often cannot be 
directly observed. Although species comparisons are used widely for understanding the 
evolution of physical characteristics and behavior in animals, they have been only more re-
cently applied to the problem of cognitive evolution (Balda and Kamil, 1989; Bond et aI., 
2003; Clayton and Krebs, 1994). 
We have used this approach to investigate economic choice in animals; growing evi-
dence suggests that species differences in natural ecology may drive differences in decision-
making and value-based preferences in experimental settings. As described previously, cot-
ton-top tamarins and common marmosets show different patterns of choice in both temporal 
discounting (Stevens et aI., 2005a) and spatial discounting (Stevens et aI., 2005b) contexts. 
As tamarins and marmosets are closely related New World monkeys with similar body sizes, 
natural histories, and social systems, we hypothesized that differences in their dietary ecol-
ogy may drive differences in their underlying decision-making mechanisms. Building off 
these results, we applied a similar approach to decision making in chimpanzees and bono-
bos. Although these species recently diverged (Won and Hey, 2005), they differ in their 
social systems and behavior, and feeding ecology is likely a major evolutionary factor driv-
ing these differences: chimpanzees are thought to live in less food-rich, more variable envi-
ronments relative to bonobos (Malenky and Wrangham, 1994; White and Wrangham, 1988). 
We hypothesized that due to these same differences in feeding ecology, chimpanzees may 
be more willing than bonobos to pay high costs of obtain food. Two studies indicated that 
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these species showed different preferences when making choices about temporal delays 
(Rosati et aI., 2007), as well as risk, or probabilistic variability in reward outcome (Heilbron-
ner et aI., 2008). Namely, chimpanzees waited longer than bonobos to receive a large food 
reward and more often chose a 'risky' option. 
These comparative studies, therefore, highlight the importance of assessing the role of 
species-typical environment in studying decision making. Applying the comparative method 
to the study of rational choice may provide similar insights as to when context-dependence 
is a successful strategy for animals to implement. 
40 Conclusions 
The myriad studies of context-dependent decision making in animals indicates that these 
purported anomalies or cognitive biases are not unique to humans but are shared with spe-
cies as taxonomically diverse as honey bees and hummingbirds. The ubiquity of these types 
of decisions suggests that either the artificial experimental paradigms are generating spuri-
ous behavior (Houston et aI., 2007b) or there are deep evolutionary roots to this behavior. 
Though an artificial environment may elicit some instances of context-dependent choice, 
this likely cannot explain all cases. Many of the studies on bees, hummingbirds, and gray 
jays use very natural settings to test subjects (Bateson et aI., 2002, 2003; Shafir et aI., 2002; 
Waite, 2001a, b). As pointed out by Schuck-Paim et al. (2004), however, it is critical that 
differences between contexts are evaluated carefully. What may appear to be a sophisticated 
discrimination between subtle contexts (such as the local context effects seen in humming-
birds) may actually result from more basic differences between the foraging scenarios, such 
as different intake rates. This provides a salient reminder that many instances of context-
dependent choice probably result from adaptive benefits associated with different contexts, 
rather than resulting from simple cognitive biases. 
This certainly does not mean, however, that all violations of rational choice can be con-
strued as forms of adaptive behavior. Many of the results discussed in this paper fall under 
the general category of foraging decisions. Yet humans make many value-based decisions 
that are not so easily categorized as foraging behaviors, and recent work has begun to adapt 
these kinds of human economics experiments for animals. These results find similar consist-
encies between human and nonhuman choices. For example, both capuchin monkeys and 
four-year-old children behave as if they devalue options they had forgone in previous choic-
es (e.g., they act as though they experience cognitive dissonance), even though no new in-
formation should lead them to change the value they associate with various options (Egan et 
aI., 2007). Similarly, chimpanzees appear to show endowment-like effects, valuing some-
thing more if they physically possess it than if they do not (Brosnan et aI., 2007). Although 
it might be possible to construct evolutionary scenarios for these kinds of decision biases, it 
is certainly more difficult to fit them in the kinds of foraging framework that seems most 
useful for the results discussed here. 
In the end, it may be phenomena like these that are critical for understanding human 
market behavior and decision-making on an individual level. Though adaptive explanations 
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may account for context dependence in nonhumans, do these explanations apply to human 
decision making? Numerous psychological and economic studies have demonstrated con-
text dependence in humans using only one-shot trials, and it seems unlikely that rate maxi-
mizing can account for these instances. So what is the role of adaptive considerations in the 
study of human decision making? Perhaps we misapply strategies that evolved in 'selection 
past' to current choice environments. Or perhaps, like other animals, we possess a compara-
tive choice mechanism; such a mechanism can approximate optimal responses much of the 
time but leads to occasional suboptimal outcomes. To disentangle these possibilities and 
better understand the adaptive nature of decision making, we must analyze decision rules 
with reference to the environment in which they were designed to operate (Gigerenzer et aI., 
1999). This can be accomplished by constructing process models of decision making that 
specify how individuals search for information, when they stop searching, and how they 
implement decision rules (Gigerenzer et aI., 1999; Hutchinson and Gigerenzer, 2005). The 
structure of the environment obviously affects the outcomes of these rules, so determining 
whether or not those rules are suboptimal must make reference to the problems decision 
makers normally encounter. From this perspective, context-dependent choice is built into a 
system of decision making tailored to specific situations for humans and animals alike. 
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